

Court File No. _____

Sino-Forest Corporation

PRE-FILING REPORT OF THE PROPOSED MONITOR

March 30, 2012

Court File No. _____

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
SINO-FOREST CORPORATION

**PRE-FILING REPORT TO THE COURT
SUBMITTED BY FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC.,
IN ITS CAPACITY AS PROPOSED MONITOR**

INTRODUCTION

1. FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("**FTI Canada**" or the "**Proposed Monitor**") has been informed that Sino-Forest Corporation (the "**Company**") intends to make an application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") and to seek an initial order (the "**Initial Order**") from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the "**Court**"), granting, *inter alia*, a stay of proceedings against the Company until April 29, 2012, (the "**Stay Period**") and appointing FTI Canada as monitor of the Company's CCAA Proceedings (defined below). The proceedings commenced by the Company under the CCAA, if granted, will be referred to herein as the "**CCAA Proceedings**".
2. FTI Canada is a trustee within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended, and is not subject to any of the restrictions on who may be appointed as monitor set out in section 11.7(2) of the CCAA. FTI Canada has provided its consent to act as Monitor.

Engagement of FTI Consulting and Preparation of this Report

3. FTI was originally retained through its Hong Kong office, FTI Consulting (Hong Kong) Limited (“**FTI HK**” and together with FTI Canada, “**FTI Consulting**”) in October 2011. The purpose of FTI HK’s retainer was primarily in connection with the work being done to determine whether the Q3 Results (defined below) could be issued. The scope of FTI HK’s retention was expanded in January 2012. The expanded role of FTI HK included assisting management in the review and preparation of detailed cash flow forecasts and analysis of outstanding receivables, including collection options. FTI Canada has been formally retained since March 12, 2012. FTI HK and FTI Canada have worked together in advising the Company and in the preparation of this report.
4. Since its engagement, FTI Consulting has worked with the Company and its advisors extensively. Among other things, FTI Consulting has:
 - (a) Attended in-person meetings involving Houlihan (defined below), senior management including the chief executive officer, chief financial officer and Allen Chan (Sino-Forest’s founder and chief executive officer up to August 2011) and others in order to gain information regarding Sino-Forest and its situation;
 - (b) Attended in-person and telephone meetings with other stakeholders including the Ad Hoc Noteholders (defined below), the Board (defined below) and others;
 - (c) Engaged legal counsel in Canada who has also participated in certain of these meetings;
 - (d) Had a local team review certain Sino-Forest documents and engage in discussions with Sino-Forest in both Hong Kong and the PRC (defined below);
 - (e) Met with Sino-Forest finance personnel located in Canada, Hong Kong

and the PRC;

- (f) Obtained financial and other information produced by Sino-Forest relating to its operations, its cash flow forecasts and current financial situation;
 - (g) Reviewed redacted versions of the IC Reports (defined below);
 - (h) Reviewed certain of the books and records of the Company;
 - (i) Reviewed the Note Indentures (defined below) and related guarantee and security documents; and
 - (j) Reviewed various other documents and materials relevant to the Company and its business.
5. As a result of these efforts, FTI Consulting has become familiar with the Company's current state of affairs including the basis on which it is now seeking CCAA protection, and approval of the Sale Process (defined below).
6. Although this Report has been prepared in anticipation of FTI Canada's appointment as monitor of the Company, it has been prepared with the same duty and care and with the same level of diligence as though FTI Canada had already been appointed to such role.
7. In preparing this report, the Proposed Monitor has relied upon unaudited financial information of the Company, the Company's books and records, certain financial information prepared by the Company, the IC Reports (defined below) and discussions with the Company's management. Other than as described in paragraph 4 above, the Proposed Monitor has not audited, reviewed or otherwise attempted to verify the accuracy or completeness of the information. Accordingly, the Proposed Monitor expresses no opinion or other form of assurance on the information contained in this Report or relied on in its preparation. Future oriented financial information reported or relied on in preparing this Report is based on management's assumptions regarding future events; actual results may vary from forecast and such variations may be material.

Purpose of this Report

8. The purpose of this report is to:
 - (a) Inform the Court on the following:
 - (i) an overview of the Company and its current situation;
 - (ii) an outline of the Proposed Monitor's understanding of circumstances that have led to the Company's current request for relief;
 - (iii) the proposed restructuring activities of the Company including the Support Agreement (defined below);
 - (iv) the Sale Process to be undertaken for the business and assets of the Sino-Forest Companies (defined below);
 - (v) the Company's March 29 Forecast (defined below); and
 - (b) Support the Company's application and recommend that the Court grant the proposed Initial Order and Sale Process Order including the following relief:
 - (i) a stay of proceedings to April 29, 2012;
 - (ii) approval of certain payments during the CCAA Proceedings;
 - (iii) approval of a charge securing the fees and expenses of the Monitor, its counsel and counsel to the Company, counsel to the Board (defined below), Houlihan, FTI HK, counsel to the Ad Hoc Noteholders (defined below) and the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Noteholders in the aggregate amount of CAD\$15 million (the "**Administration Charge**");
 - (iv) approval of a charge securing an indemnity in favour of the

directors and officers of the Company in the aggregate amount of CAD\$3.2 million (the “**Directors’ Charge**”);

- (v) approval of the engagement of Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc. (“**Houlihan**”), pursuant to an engagement letter dated as of December 22, 2011, (the “**Financial Advisor Agreement**”);
 - (vi) approval of the Sale Process (defined below); and
 - (vii) authorizing and directing the Company and the Proposed Monitor to engage in certain procedures to notify the Company’s noteholders regarding certain issues related to the Support Agreement (defined below).
9. Unless otherwise stated, all monetary amounts contained herein are expressed in US Dollars.
10. The terms “**Sino-Forest Companies**” and “**Sino-Forest**” refer to the global enterprise as a whole but do not include references to the Greenheart Group (defined below).
11. This report focuses on the Company’s current situation and immediate need for court protection. This report should be read in conjunction with the affidavit of W. Judson Martin, vice-chairman and chief executive officer of the Company, sworn March 30, 2012 (the “**Martin Affidavit**”) which provides an overview as to Sino-Forest’s history, business and operations and is therefore not repeated herein.

BACKGROUND

Overview of Sino-Forest

12. Sino-Forest conducts business as a forest plantation operator in the People’s Republic of China (“**PRC**”). Its principal businesses include ownership and management of forest plantation trees, the sale of standing timber and wood logs

and complementary manufacturing of downstream engineered-wood products.

13. The Company is a public holding company whose common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“**TSX**”). Prior to August 26, 2011 (the date of the Cease Trade Order, defined below), the Company had 246,095,926 common shares issued and outstanding and trading under the trading symbol “**TRE**” on the TSX.
14. On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters, LLC (“**MW**”), which held a short position on the Company’s shares, issued a report (the “**MW Report**”) alleging, among other things, that Sino-Forest is a “ponzi-scheme” and a “near total fraud”. The MW Report was issued publicly and immediately caught the attention of the media on a world-wide basis.
15. Since the issuance of the MW Report, the Company has devoted extensive time and resources to investigate and address the allegations in the MW Report as well as responding to additional inquiries from, among others, the Ontario Securities Commission (the “**OSC**”), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“**RCMP**”) and the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (“**HKSFC**”).
16. To carry out this work, on June 2, 2011, the Company’s board of directors (the “**Board**”) appointed a three (3) person independent committee (the “**IC**”) to investigate the allegations contained in the MW Report. The IC retained three (3) law firms in Canada, Hong Kong and the PRC as well as financial advisors to assist in the IC investigation.
17. The IC ultimately issued three (3) reports on August 10, 2011, November 13, 2011 and January 31, 2012 (the “**First Interim Report**” the “**Second Report**” and the “**Final Report**” and collectively, the “**IC Reports**”). The IC was able to reach many conclusions addressing many of the allegations contained in the MW Report. However, the IC was unable to make certain conclusions, particularly as it related to certain of Sino-Forest’s relationships with third party intermediaries and suppliers. The inability of the IC (and others) to have conclusively resolved those

issues has had an ongoing impact on the Company, namely the ability of the Company to issue its Q3 Results and the 2011 Financial Statements (both defined below).

18. With the issuance of its Final Report, the IC concluded its active investigation. However, the Board established a Special Restructuring Committee of the Board comprised exclusively of directors independent of management of the Company for the purpose of supervising, analyzing and managing strategic options available to the Company.
19. Despite the work that was done by the IC, the IC's advisors, the Company (including senior management) and others in the last nine months, it is apparent to the Proposed Monitor that the MW Report, the subsequent litigation and regulatory investigations and other issues continue to have a significant negative impact on the Company and have threatened the long term viability of Sino-Forest's operations. For the reasons discussed below, the Proposed Monitor is of the view that the events and occurrences over the last nine months have led the Company and the business into a stalemate that cannot be resolved without a Court supervised solution.

Current State of Sino-Forest

20. The Proposed Monitor understands that the current state of the Sino-Forest Companies is effectively as follows:
 - (a) Business impact:
 - (i) The ability of Sino-Forest to access new offshore capital injections for expansion has dried up and PRC funding has been substantially curtailed given the uncertainty around the Company;
 - (ii) The Proposed Monitor understands that operations in the trading and standing timber business outside the PRC and the standing timber business in the WFOEs are effectively frozen, the trading

business has stopped importing (other than the existing Thai Redwood transaction which is ongoing) and manufacturing is operating at lower levels than normal;

- (iii) Many customers have ceased paying their receivables despite concentrated efforts by Sino-Forest to collect on outstanding balances, which, the Proposed Monitor understands includes SFC's counsel in the PRC sending legal demand letters to 12 BVI trading companies for accounts receivable totalling approximately \$126 million and 5 WFOE companies totalling approximately RMB 224.5 million;
 - (iv) Sino-Forest has had to reserve millions of dollars to pay suppliers for outstanding debts, in order to avoid litigation or further hostile situations from its suppliers and landlords/farmers (which the Proposed Monitor understands has historically involved threats of violence and occupation of Sino-Forest offices in Hunan);
 - (v) The Company has been unable to release its financial results for the nine-month period ended September 30, 2011 (the "**Q3 Results**") and for reasons discussed below, is unlikely to be in a position to release such statements in the near term, if ever;
 - (vi) The Company has been unable to release its 2011 audited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2011 ("**2011 Financial Statements**") and for reasons discussed below, is unlikely to be in a position to release such statements in the near term, if ever;
- (b) Financial situation:
- (i) As of March 23, 2012, the Company has approximately \$70.5 million in cash;

- (ii) The ability to repatriate funds from the PRC into off shore (i.e. non-PRC) companies is limited by many factors including the historic “BVI” corporate structure, state administration of foreign exchange (“SAFE”) regulations and other currency control issues (which are discussed extensively in the Martin Affidavit);
 - (iii) The Company has limited prospects of being able to raise further capital or debt in the near future;
 - (iv) Sino-Forest has not been able to secure or renew certain existing onshore banking facilities, has been unable to obtain offshore letters of credit to facilitate Sino-Forest’s trading business, and all offshore banking facilities have been repaid and frozen, or cancelled;
 - (v) Sino-Forest’s operating subsidiaries have lost access to capital injections, local bank financing and intercompany funding for expansion opportunities due to the Company’s financial situation;
 - (vi) Due to the business constraints above, Sino-Forest’s operations are now operating on a significant burn as they are being pressured to continue to honour payables while collecting minimal receivables and failing to generate significant new sales;
- (c) Legal and Regulatory Proceedings:
- (i) Sino-Forest continues to divert significant resources to address the ongoing regulatory and criminal investigations by the OSC and the RCMP as well as inquiries from the HKSFC;
 - (ii) Numerous class actions have been commenced in Canada and the US and more are threatened;
 - (iii) The OSC has issued a Cease Trade Order in respect of the Company’s shares, which is ongoing;

- (d) Default under the Note Indentures:
- (i) As a result of the Company's failure to issue its Q3 Results, the Company is in default (the "**Financial Reporting Covenant Default**") under its four (4) series of issued notes (the "**Notes**") and is unlikely to be in a position to cure such default in the near term, if ever;
 - (ii) On January 12, 2012, the Company announced that holders of a majority of its 2014 Senior Notes and 2017 Senior Notes (who had issued default notices under their respective note indentures) had agreed to waive (the "**Waiver Agreements**") the Financial Reporting Covenant Default on certain terms and conditions (discussed below) including a covenant to make certain interest payments;
 - (iii) The Waiver Agreements terminate on the earlier of April 30, 2012 and any earlier termination of the Waiver Agreements in accordance with their terms;
 - (iv) The failure to deliver the 2011 Financial Statements by March 31, 2011 will constitute a further default under the Note Indentures (subject to a 30 day cure period);
- (e) Failure to Produce Q3 Results and 2011 Audited Statements
- (i) As set out in the IC's Second Report, subsequent to August 26, 2011, a number of documents came to the IC's attention that required further investigation and review;
 - (ii) On or before November 15, 2011, the deadline for the release of the Q3 Results, the Board's audit committee recommended and the Board agreed that the Company should defer the release of the Q3 Results until certain issues could be resolved to the satisfaction of

the Board and the Company's external auditor;

- (iii) The issues included (A) determining the nature and scope of the relationships between Sino-Forest and certain of its AIs (defined below) and suppliers, as discussed in the Second Report, and (B) the satisfactory explanation and resolution of issues raised by certain documents identified by the IC's advisors, the Company's counsel, the Company's auditors, and/or by OSC staff;
- (iv) Although the Company (and the IC) continued to work to resolve these issues, the allegations set out in the MW Report and raised by the OSC, the Company subsequently announced that there was no assurance that it would be able to release the Q3 Results, or, if able, as to when such release would occur;
- (v) Those same issues outlined above remain gating items to the Company's ability to release 2011 Audited Financial Statements;
- (f) Political Factors:
 - (i) Sino-Forest requires ongoing support from all levels of the PRC government to operate its business in a manner that will be profitable;
 - (ii) To date, the PRC government has been supportive, but has recently expressed concern regarding the ongoing distress of the business and has indicated that it expects the Company to propose a viable solution in the near future; and
 - (iii) Loss of support from the PRC government would likely be fatal to any chance of success in restructuring the Company in a way that maximizes value for the Company's stakeholders.

21. In summary, Sino-Forest's state of affairs is such that it cannot maintain a status quo for much longer.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CCAA APPLICATION

22. The Martin Affidavit provides a detailed outline of Sino-Forest's corporate structure, business, reported assets and financial information. The Martin Affidavit also provides a detailed chronology of the Company and its actions since the issuance of the MW Report in June 2011 including the formation of the IC, the issuance and conclusions set out in the IC Reports, the Class Actions, the OSC, RCMP and HKSFC investigations and the defaults under the Notes.
23. This Report does not propose to repeat those details. Instead, the Proposed Monitor has focused on the following areas, which it believes are relevant for understanding the basis on which it is recommending the granting of the Initial Order and the approval of the Sale Process at this time:
- (a) Sino-Forest's historical method of doing business and certain of the legal issues that are embedded within that structure;
 - (b) the role of the PRC government and the forestry industry in the PRC; and
 - (c) Sino-Forest's current options.

The Company's history

24. Sino-Forest operates through two different corporate models – the “BVI” model and the “WFOE” model. It is significant to understand the corporate models used by Sino-Forest in its operations because of the corresponding issues associated with repatriating value offshore from each of those various entities.

BVI Forestry Holding Companies (“BVIs”)

25. Until 2004, Sino-Forest used the BVI model exclusively to invest in timber rights in the PRC. The Proposed Monitor understands that the BVI model essentially involves the use of a British Virgin Island company to invest in timber rights in the PRC. Due to the restrictions on foreign companies under PRC law which do not permit foreign companies to conduct business in the PRC without business

licenses granted by competent government authorities, BVIs must carry on their sale activities through authorized intermediaries (“AIs”) onshore. Further, BVIs are not permitted to have bank accounts in the PRC. It is the AIs who enter into the direct contracts for the sale of standing timber with end customers. AIs are also responsible for remitting taxes arising from sales to the relevant PRC tax authorities. Once money is in the BVI system, it has never been repatriated off shore and any profit has always been re-invested in further plantation timber rights. The only exception to that are in the small instances where Sino-Forest has tested its on-shoring strategy (discussed in further detail below).

26. The BVI model was the model used by Sino-Forest when it started operations in 1994 due to the restrictions on foreign business operations in the PRC. Over the years, the BVI model was therefore used to purchase significant amounts of Sino-Forest’s reported timber holdings (approximately 60% of its reported timber holdings). From an investor/creditor perspective, the model is problematic for a number of reasons including:
- (a) BVIs are restricted from carrying on business directly in the PRC – as such, many of the title verification issues that were contained in the MW Report and arose during the IC investigation were due to the fact that when BVIs purchase timber, they are only purchasing the timber rights and not any underlying land use rights (which interests are capable of being registered in most parts of the PRC);
 - (b) BVIs must sell through the AIs. This has resulted in a certain lack of transparency in a number of issues that were the focus of the MW Report and the IC investigation – including the relationships between the AIs and certain of the suppliers, an inability to see into the books and records of the AIs to verify booked sales, and the extent to which the AIs had, in fact, remitted applicable taxes to relevant tax authorities; and
 - (c) The Proposed Monitor understands that for various reasons, but primarily related to the SAFE regulations, there is no way for a BVI to efficiently

repatriate cash off shore without giving rise to significant negative tax consequences - as such, since the businesses' inception, all profit has simply been further re-invested in the BVI model in new trees.

WFOEs

27. In 2004, the Ministry of Commerce for the PRC began allowing wholly foreign owned enterprises (“**WFOEs**”) to conduct business in the trading of timber on shore in the PRC. Post 2004, almost all of Sino-Forest’s new capital invested in timber assets has been employed through the WFOE model. The Proposed Monitor understands that the WFOE model is preferable for several reasons including:

- (a) WFOEs can conduct business on shore in the PRC and as such, they do not need to use the AI model. They can (and do) transact directly with customers;
- (b) Financial information as to the WFOE holdings on Sino-Forest’s books and records is more readily verifiable and therefore more transparent in nature;
- (c) WFOEs can acquire land use rights through pre-paid long term leases. The ability of WFOEs to invest in land use rights is advantageous because (i) for the most part, it appears that these rights can be registered and are therefore more easily verifiable; (ii) the WFOE can finance its business against its land rights; and (iii) it is viewed favourably by the PRC because it is evidence of Sino-Forest’s long term intentions within the forestry industry in the PRC; and
- (d) WFOEs are preferable from a foreign investor perspective because there is an identifiable process for the repatriation of funds off-shore to the foreign investor parent.

28. As of December 31, 2010, approximately 40% of Sino-Forest’s reported timber

holdings were held through the WFOE structure.

On-shoring

29. As part of its long term strategy, the Company has been considering options to transition its BVI assets into WFOE assets. This process is referred to as “on-shoring”. The Proposed Monitor understands there is no single standard protocol for on-shoring Sino-Forest’s assets and that Sino-Forest is looking into various alternative methods of migrating the ownership of the BVI assets. At its root, on-shoring requires the creation of a new WFOE that is capitalized to receive timber rights from the BVIs and at the same time, acquire the accompanying underlying land use rights. The Proposed Monitor understands that the precise methods for successfully on-shoring varies on a county to county basis and requires extensive negotiations with various stakeholders including potentially the land owners and tax authorities. It could also involve the cooperation of suppliers and AIs.
30. The Proposed Monitor understands there are no assurances that on-shoring will be successful on a large scale basis and that, even if the Company is successful in on-shoring certain of its assets, that does not necessarily mean it will be successful in other regions. However, the Company has indicated that it believes there are incentives for parties to cooperate with an on-shoring process as it generally involves the promotion of business in more rural areas, the ongoing employment of individuals in those regions and cash injections to the land owners on the pre-paid leases.

The Role of the PRC Government

31. Based on the conversations that the Proposed Monitor has had with members of senior management of the Company and various of its advisors, the Proposed Monitor understands that the PRC government has and will continue to play a key role in any successful restructuring.
32. The forestry industry in the PRC is subject to The Forestry Law which provides for a limited system pursuant to which verification as to legal ownership of timber

- or land may be obtained. The Monitor has also been advised that it is not clear that the Forestry Law has been fully implemented on a nation-wide basis such that, in some instances, no verification from regional forestry bureaus may be available.
33. The Company has advised that the PRC has taken numerous steps in the last years to promote the timber plantation industry including opportunities for foreign investment. It is also apparent that navigating timber operations within the PRC has obvious political and state related implications due to the role of the Chinese government in business operations in China generally, the geographic location of many of the plantations, the reliance upon provincial and other registries for asset verification, and the uncertainty surrounding certain taxation and other laws in the PRC that could have significant implications on Sino-Forest's business structure and/or ability to expand.
34. Further, it is clear that in many instances, there is an emphasis put on "business relationships" among parties that is paramount to any contractual or legal relationship that may have been entered into by the parties. These relationships are relied upon for the conduct of business in this industry in the PRC. In the course of its investigation, the IC reported that it was apparent that integral to Sino-Forest's business model was its relationships with business partners.
35. The Company has advised the Proposed Monitor that it believes that the PRC has been and will continue to be supportive of Sino-Forest as an ongoing business. Sino-Forest is the largest private forestry operator in the PRC and it has complied with and promoted PRC policy in terms of growth and efficiency in the natural resource sector over its 18 years of business. All of these factors have resulted in Sino-Forest having a positive and encouraging relationship with the PRC government. Consequently, the PRC government has, by and large, been facilitative of Sino-Forest's business. Ongoing support will be required if this restructuring process is to be successful. Maintaining relations with the PRC government both nationally and locally will also be crucial to Sino-Forest's on-shoring strategy.

36. Through extensive discussions that the Proposed Monitor has had with the Company and various advisors to the Company, it has become apparent that much of Sino-Forest's historical success has been due to the leadership of Allen Chan. Although Mr. Chan resigned as CEO and chairman after the issuance of the MW Report, Mr. Chan has remained involved in Sino-Forest and, in particular, plays a key role in maintaining and building on existing PRC relations. The Martin Affidavit also contains further detail as to the importance of Mr. Chan in any restructuring.
37. It is equally clear to the Proposed Monitor that the PRC government has the ability to be a significant impediment to solutions that it does not view as favourable or in furtherance of PRC policy. The Company and Houlihan have both expressed the view that if attempts were made to break up the company, that could be viewed as being contrary to the general direction of, and have a significant impact on, the PRC's natural resource growth policies and would likely be viewed negatively by the PRC government. Further, the PRC government is cognizant of the location of many of the Sino-Forest plantations and their proximity to state run facilities and has expressed concern to the Company as to how these issues will be addressed going forward if ownership is to change hands.

The Company's Options

38. The Proposed Monitor is aware that the Company, in consultation with its various advisors, has considered many alternatives to solve both the Company's current problems as well as to provide longer term solutions to the issues inherent in the BVI structure. For various reasons, the options of maintaining the status quo or attempting to liquidate the assets (i.e. timber) are not feasible options notwithstanding the guarantees and pledges that may have given the noteholders certain rights to do so. Some of the issues that would prohibit status quo or liquidation are as follows:
- (a) Status quo – as set out above and in the Martin Affidavit, the MW Report

and subsequent events have left the Sino-Forest business paralyzed and unable to continue. Sources of outside funding for expansion have dried up, sales have been halted while the business continues to burn money necessary to its operations. Further, the Company has advised that based on meetings between members of senior management and the PRC, the PRC is not content to allow Sino-Forest's current situation to continue indefinitely and has insisted that a path forward for Sino-Forest be proposed;

- (b) Liquidation – It is not clear to the Proposed Monitor that a liquidation could even be achieved in this circumstance. However, even if it could be, liquidating the timber assets within the PRC is unlikely to achieve any desired result. As set out above, given the historical structural issues inherent within the BVI structure, it is doubtful that any proceeds of a liquidation could be moved off shore successfully.
39. The Proposed Monitor is aware that the Company and its advisors have engaged in extensive conversations and negotiations with an ad hoc committee of noteholders (the “**Ad Hoc Noteholders**”) for the past several months as to the various options available to Sino-Forest as well as the noteholders.
40. The Proposed Monitor understands that these extensive arm's length negotiations involved email, telephonic and in-person meetings between the various parties and have included, at different times, the Company's senior management (including Mr. Martin, the Company's chief financial officer, Mr. David Horsley and Mr. Chan), Houlihan, the Company's legal advisors, certain of the Ad Hoc Noteholders themselves and their legal and financial advisors. During the course of these meetings, the parties have explored the options available to both the Company and the noteholders including the liquidation option.

THE SUPPORT AGREEMENT AND PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING

41. Following extensive arm's length negotiations, the Company and the Ad Hoc

Noteholders have reached agreement on the terms of a support agreement (the “**Support Agreement**”). The Proposed Support Agreement has been executed by holders of the Notes holding approximately 40% of the Notes. The Support Agreement contemplates (and provides incentive for) additional noteholders becoming party to the Support Agreement by way of Joinder Agreement. As set out below, it is contemplated that the Proposed Monitor will post a copy of the Support Agreement on its website. The material terms of the Support Agreement are set out in the Martin Affidavit.

42. The Proposed Monitor has reviewed the terms of the Support Agreement. The Proposed Monitor believes that the terms of the Support Agreement are reasonable in the circumstances. In reaching that conclusion, the Proposed Monitor first considered the fact that Sino-Forest’s situation is not that of a typical debtor. The Company’s options in terms of realizing value on its assets are limited given not only the legal impediments, but also the nature and location of the physical assets. Further, other considerations included the following:
- (a) Neither maintaining the status quo nor liquidation are realistic options;
 - (b) The debt outstanding under the Indentures constitutes an overwhelming majority of the Company’s overall debt;
 - (c) The Support Agreement proposes a solution through the use of a CCAA plan that provides for, among other things:
 - (i) a structured solution pursuant to which the business operations will be liberated from the existing legal challenges facing the Company (namely the extensive litigation and contingent claims) and put into a new structure which will ultimately be able to work to fix the structural issues in Sino-Forest’s business;
 - (ii) participation rights for certain junior constituents whose claims rank behind the noteholders;

- (iii) a framework for the litigation and/or resolution of the claims faced by the Company;
- (d) As discussed below, there are significant challenges to finding another buyer of the business;
- (e) Notwithstanding those challenges, the Support Agreement contemplates a Sale Process (defined and discussed below) to determine whether a higher or better option is available; and
- (f) As discussed above, neither maintaining the status quo nor liquidation are desirable or possibly viable options.

THE PROPOSED SALE PROCESS

Sale Process Terms

- 43. As contemplated under the Support Agreement, the Company is also seeking approval of certain sale process procedures (the “**Sale Process**”) and related relief. If approved, the Company, in consultation with the Proposed Monitor and Houlihan, will immediately commence a marketing process for the Sino-Forest business.
- 44. The material terms of the Sale Process are set out in the Martin Affidavit. The Proposed Monitor has been consulted in the development of the proposed Sale Process terms and believes they are reasonable in the circumstances.
- 45. The Company, the Proposed Monitor, Houlihan, and advisors to the Ad Hoc Noteholders have had extensive discussions as to the appropriate time frame in which the business may be marketed. The Proposed Monitor believes that it is appropriate for the Company to seek approval of the Sale Process as part of its initial application based on the following factors:
 - (a) As set out above, the growth of the forestry business and the trading business has effectively come to a halt and are rapidly burning cash;

- (b) The Sino-Forest business is extremely complicated – for any buyer, there will be significant legal, tax, regulatory, political and cultural considerations that will need to be addressed;
 - (c) Given the extensive negative publicity that has surrounded the business, buyers will likely require extensive due diligence and that may include not just document review, but meetings in HK as well as the PRC, site visits and other time intensive exercises;
 - (d) Timber is a seasonal business with the majority of sales taking place in Q3 and Q4 of each year – if a transaction is not completed before the end of Q3 of this year, that will effectively result in a further year with few or no sales; and
 - (e) The Company needs to be able to demonstrate to the PRC government, in the near future, that it has a clear path forward, absent which it risks losing its support.
46. The proposed Sale Process is intended to be a market test of the terms of the proposed restructuring set out in the Support Agreement. However, given the size of the business and the issues surrounding the business, both Houlihan and the Company have indicated that there is likely to be a limited landscape of potential buyers. The Proposed Monitor agrees that this may be the case but nonetheless believes that it is important as part of the CCAA Proceedings that the Sale Process be commenced to determine what other interest may exist.
47. Given the urgency described above, the Proposed Monitor is aware that Houlihan has already commenced certain efforts in respect of the proposed Sale Process. Given the circumstances of this situation, the Proposed Monitor is of the view that such actions by Houlihan have been prudent.

Retention of Houlihan

48. In anticipation of a potential filing and Sale Process, the Company retained

- Houlihan pursuant to the terms of the Financial Advisor Agreement. The terms of the Financial Advisor Agreement, including the proposed fee structure, are set out in the Martin Affidavit. The Proposed Monitor is aware that the Company considered at least three (3) other candidates, all of whom are well-known international investment banks, prior to retaining Houlihan.
49. The Proposed Monitor understands that the Board's decision to retain Houlihan was based on Houlihan's experience in debt restructurings including working with noteholders as well as its extensive presence in North American and Asian markets.
50. The Proposed Monitor has reviewed the terms of the Financial Advisor Agreement. The Proposed Monitor believes that, in the circumstances, it is reasonable for the Company to have retained Houlihan and negotiated the terms contained in the Financial Advisor Agreement. Accordingly, the Proposed Monitor recommends the approval of the Financial Advisor Agreement.

THE COMPANY'S CASH FLOW FORECAST

Cash Flow Projections

51. The Company, with the assistance of the Proposed Monitor, has prepared consolidated 13-week cash flow projections of its receipts and disbursements (the "**March 29 Forecast**"). The March 29 Forecast, together with the management's report on the cash-flow statement as required by section 10(2)(b) of the CCAA, is attached hereto as Appendix A. The March 29 Forecast shows a negative net cash flow of approximately \$19.3 million in the period March 31 to June 29, 2012, and is summarized below:

	\$000 CAD
Cash inflow	
Interest Income	\$ 412
Total cash inflows	\$ 412
Cash outflow	
Payroll and Benefits	\$ 181
Board & Committee Fees	\$ 253
Travel	\$ 315
Rent, Communication & Utilities	\$ 60
Taxes & Other	\$ 195
Total cash outflows	\$ 1,004
Net Operating Cashflow	\$ (591)
Restructuring Costs	
Professional Fees	\$ 18,730
Total Restructuring Costs	\$ 18,730
Net Cash Flow	\$ (19,321)
Opening Cash Balance	\$ 67,846
Net Cash Balance	\$ (19,321)
Ending Cash Balance	\$ 48,525

52. It is anticipated that the Company’s projected liquidity requirements throughout the CCAA Proceedings will be met by existing cash available to the Company.

Proposed Monitor’s Report on the Reasonableness of the Cash Flow Projections

53. Section 23(1)(b) of the CCAA states that the Proposed Monitor shall:

“review the company’s cash-flow statement as to its reasonableness and file a report with the court on the Proposed Monitor’s findings;”

54. Pursuant to section 23(1)(b) of the CCAA and in accordance with the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals Standard of Practice 09-1 (“CAIRP SOP 09-1”), the Proposed Monitor hereby reports as follows:

- (a) The March 29 Forecast has been prepared by the management of the

Applicant for the purpose described in Note 1, using the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions set out in Notes 2 to 6;

- (b) The Proposed Monitor's review consisted of inquiries, analytical procedures and discussion related to information supplied by certain of the management and employees of the Company. Since Hypothetical Assumptions need not be supported, the Proposed Monitor's procedures with respect to them were limited to evaluating whether they were consistent with the purpose of the March 29 Forecast. The Proposed Monitor has also reviewed the support provided by management of the Company for the Probable Assumptions, and the preparation and presentation of the Cash-Flow Statement;
- (c) Based on its review, nothing has come to the attention of the Proposed Monitor that causes it to believe that, in all material respects:
 - (i) the Hypothetical Assumptions are not consistent with the purpose of the March 29 Forecast;
 - (ii) as at the date of this report, the Probable Assumptions developed by management are not suitably supported and consistent with the plans of the Company or do not provide a reasonable basis for the March 29 Forecast, given the Hypothetical Assumptions; or
 - (iii) the March 29 Forecast does not reflect the Probable and Hypothetical Assumptions;
- (d) Since the March 29 Forecast is based on assumptions regarding future events, actual results will vary from the information presented even if the Hypothetical Assumptions occur, and the variations may be material. Accordingly, the Proposed Monitor expresses no assurance as to whether the March 29 Forecast will be achieved. The Proposed Monitor expresses no opinion or other form of assurance with respect to the accuracy of any financial information presented in this report, or relied upon by the

Proposed Monitor in preparing this report; and

- (e) The March 29 Forecast has been prepared solely for the purpose described in Note 1 on the face of the March 29 Forecast and readers are cautioned that it may not be appropriate for other purposes.

RELIEF SOUGHT

The Stay of Proceedings

- 55. For the reasons set out herein, the Company requires a stay of proceedings while it carries out its proposed restructuring activities. The Monitor believes that the initial 30-day request is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Payments During the CCAA Proceedings

- 56. The Company intends to make certain ordinary course payments during the course of the CCAA Proceedings in accordance with and as set out in the March 29 Forecast. The Monitor believes this course of action is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Administration Charge

- 57. The Company is seeking an Administration Charge in the amount of CAD\$15 million with priority over all encumbrances against the Company's assets other than the Company's assets which are subject to *Personal Property Security Act* registrations (the "**Encumbered Property**"). Based on personal property registry searches that were conducted by the Proposed Monitor's counsel as of March 28, 2012, other than the Indenture Trustees under the Notes who have security in respect of the pledged shares of the Company's subsidiaries there was only one registration that appeared on its face to be with respect to specific equipment.
- 58. The beneficiaries of the Administration Charge if granted would be the Proposed Monitor, the Proposed Monitor's counsel, counsel to the Board, FTI HK, counsel to the Company, Houlihan, counsel to the Ad Hoc Noteholders and the financial

advisor to the Ad Hoc Noteholders.

59. The Proposed Monitor has reviewed the underlying assumptions upon which the Company has based the quantum of the proposed Administration Charge, the complexities of the CCAA Proceedings and the services to be provided by the beneficiaries of the Administration Charge and believes that the limit of CAD\$15 million is reasonable in the circumstances.
60. The Proposed Monitor also believes that it is appropriate that the other proposed beneficiaries of the Administration Charge be afforded the benefit of a charge as they will be undertaking a necessary and integral role in the CCAA Proceedings.

The Directors' Charge

61. The Company is seeking the Directors' Charge in the amount of CAD\$3.2 million with priority over all encumbrances on the Company's assets other than the Administration Charge and the Encumbered Property. The Proposed Monitor understands that the Board has insisted on the protection of the Directors' Charge in order to remain on the Board during the course of the CCAA Proceedings. The Martin Affidavit also sets out a summary of the current insurance policies that are available to the Board as well as the exclusions and possibility of non-renewal at the end of the term.

The Financial Advisor Agreement

62. Houlihan's engagement is reasonable given the Company's proposed Sale Process. As set out above, Houlihan was considered along with other international investment banks and selected on merit- based criteria.

Publication of Notices Support Agreement

63. The proposed initial order contemplates that the Monitor will, among other things,
 - (a) Without delay, post a copy of the Support Agreement on its website at <http://cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/sfc>; and

- (b) Publish a notice in the Globe and Mail and the Wall Street Journal (in form and substance satisfactory to the Company, the Monitor and counsel to the Ad Hoc Noteholders) notifying noteholders of the Support Agreement and the deadline of 5:00pm (Toronto time) on the Consent Date (as defined in the Support Agreement) by which any noteholders (other than an Initial Consenting Noteholder) who wishes to become entitled to the Early Consent Consideration pursuant to the Support Agreement must execute and return a Joinder Agreement.

The Sale Process

64. As set out above, the proposed Sale Process is contemplated by the Support Agreement and is intended to test the market to determine whether a higher or better offer than the transaction contemplated under the Support Agreement is available. Further, given the circumstances and complexities of the situation as set out above, the Proposed Monitor recommends approval of the Sale Process Order on the date of this application.


CONCLUSION

65. The Proposed Monitor is of the view that the relief requested by the Company is necessary, reasonable and justified. The Proposed Monitor is also of the view that granting the relief requested will provide the Company the best opportunity to undertake the CCAA Proceedings, to preserve value and maximize recoveries for the Company's stakeholders. As set out above, absent a restructuring, the Monitor is of the view that the business has little chance of viability. Further, given the circumstances, liquidation would likely destroy any stakeholder value.
66. Accordingly, the Proposed Monitor respectfully recommends that the Company's request for the Initial Order and the Sale Process Order.


The Proposed Monitor respectfully submits to the Court this Pre-Filing Report.

Dated this 30th day of March, 2012.

FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
In its capacity as proposed monitor of
Sino-Forest Corporation, and not in its personal capacity



Greg Watson
Senior Managing Director



Jodi B. Porepa
Managing Director

APPENDIX A

Attached.

Court File No. _____

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
SINO-FOREST CORPORATION

(the "Applicants")

**REPORT ON CASH FLOW STATEMENT
(paragraph 10.2(b) of the CCAA)**

The management of Sino-Forest ("SFC" or the "Company") has developed the assumptions and prepared the attached statement of projected cash flow of SFC as of the 29th day of March 2012, consisting of a 13 week cash flow for the period March 31, 2012 to June 29, 2012 (the "March 29 Cash Flow").

The hypothetical assumptions are reasonable and consistent with the purpose of the projections as described in Note 1 to the cash flow, and the probable assumptions are suitably supported and consistent with the plans of SFC and provide a reasonable basis for the March 29 Cash Flow. All such assumptions are disclosed in Notes 2 to 6.

Since the March 29 Cash Flow is based on future events, actual results will vary from the information presented and the variations may be material.

The March 29 Cash Flow has been prepared solely for the purpose outlined in Note 1, using the probably and hypothetical assumptions set out in Notes 2 to 6. Consequently readers are cautioned that the March 29 Cash Flow may not be suitable for other purposes.

Dated at Hong Kong this 30th day of March 2012.



David Horsley
Senior Vice President & Chief Financial Officer
Sino-Forest Corporation

Sino-Forest Corporation
13 Week Cash Flow Forecast
(CAD \$000)

	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6	Week 7	Week 8	Week 9	Week 10	Week 11	Week 12	Week 13	Total
	6-Apr	13-Apr	20-Apr	27-Apr	4-May	11-May	18-May	25-May	1-Jun	8-Jun	15-Jun	22-Jun	29-Jun	13 Week Total
Week Ending														
Cash inflow														
Interest Income	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 412
Total cashinflow	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 412
Cash outflow														
Payroll and Benefits	\$ -	\$ 30	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 30	\$ -	\$ 30	\$ -	\$ 30	\$ -	\$ 30	\$ -	\$ 30	\$ 181
Board & Committee Fees	\$ 71	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 91	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 91	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 253
Travel	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ 26	\$ -	\$ 315
Rent,Communication & Utilities	\$ 1	\$ 16	\$ 1	\$ 1	\$ 1	\$ 1	\$ 16	\$ 1	\$ 1	\$ 1	\$ 16	\$ 1	\$ -	\$ 60
Taxes & Other	\$ 33	\$ 10	\$ 13	\$ 14	\$ 29	\$ 9	\$ 13	\$ 29	\$ 13	\$ 9	\$ 13	\$ 9	\$ -	\$ 195
Total cash outflow	\$ 131	\$ 83	\$ 40	\$ 41	\$ 178	\$ 37	\$ 86	\$ 56	\$ 162	\$ 37	\$ 86	\$ 37	\$ 30	\$ 1,004
Net Operating Cashflow	\$ (131)	\$ (83)	\$ (40)	\$ (41)	\$ (178)	\$ (37)	\$ (86)	\$ (56)	\$ (162)	\$ (37)	\$ (86)	\$ (37)	\$ 382	\$ (591)
Restructuring Costs														
Professional Fees	\$ 1,910	\$ 1,101	\$ 929	\$ 2,859	\$ 929	\$ 929	\$ 945	\$ 2,875	\$ 945	\$ 945	\$ 945	\$ 945	\$ 2,475	\$ 18,730
Total Restructuring Costs	\$ 1,910	\$ 1,101	\$ 929	\$ 2,859	\$ 929	\$ 929	\$ 945	\$ 2,875	\$ 945	\$ 945	\$ 945	\$ 945	\$ 2,475	\$ 18,730
Net Cash Flow	\$ (2,041)	\$ (1,183)	\$ (969)	\$ (2,900)	\$ (1,107)	\$ (965)	\$ (1,031)	\$ (2,931)	\$ (1,107)	\$ (982)	\$ (1,031)	\$ (982)	\$ (2,093)	\$ (19,321)
Opening Cash Balance	\$ 67,846	\$ 65,804	\$ 64,621	\$ 63,653	\$ 60,753	\$ 59,646	\$ 58,681	\$ 57,650	\$ 54,719	\$ 53,612	\$ 52,630	\$ 51,599	\$ 50,617	\$ 67,846
Net Cash Balance	\$ (2,041)	\$ (1,183)	\$ (969)	\$ (2,900)	\$ (1,107)	\$ (965)	\$ (1,031)	\$ (2,931)	\$ (1,107)	\$ (982)	\$ (1,031)	\$ (982)	\$ (2,093)	\$ (19,321)
Ending Cash Balance	\$ 65,804	\$ 64,621	\$ 63,653	\$ 60,753	\$ 59,646	\$ 58,681	\$ 57,650	\$ 54,719	\$ 53,612	\$ 52,630	\$ 51,599	\$ 50,617	\$ 48,525	\$ 48,525

Notes

- 1** The purpose of this Cash Flow Forecast is to determine the liquidity requirements for Sino-Forest Corporation during the CCAA Proceedings.
- 2** Receipts have been forecast based on historical payment patterns.
- 3** Payroll costs and other operating expenses are forecast based on historical analysis and management forecast.
- 4** Board and Committee Fees are based on board resolutions passed to date.
- 5** Travel costs have been forecast based on expected travel costs to be incurred throughout the CCAA proceedings between Canada and Hong Kong.
- 6** Estimated restructuring costs are based on projected costs associated with legal and professional fees relating to the CCAA Proceedings.

Court File No.:

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, AS AMENDED
AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SINO-FOREST CORPORATION**

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(Commercial List)**

(PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT TORONTO)

**PRE-FILING REPORT OF THE PROPOSED
MONITOR, FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC.**

GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
1 First Canadian Place
100 King Street West, Suite 1600
Toronto ON M5X 1G5

Derrick Tay (LSUC No. 21152A)
Tel: (416) 369-7330 / Fax: (416) 862-7661
Email: derrick.tay@gowlings.com

Jennifer Stam (LSUC No 46735J)
Tel: (416) 862-5697 / Fax: (416) 862-7661
Email: jennifer.stam@gowlings.com

Lawyers for the Proposed Monitor,
FTI Consulting Canada Inc.